Barnes v. Felix: Redefining the Standard for Excessive Force Under the Fourth Amendment | New York Personal Injury & Employment Law Firm

Table of Contents

Introduction

A routine traffic stop that ended in a fatal police shooting has prompted the U.S. Supreme Court to revisit how courts evaluate police use of force. In Barnes v. Felix (No. 23-1239, attorneys for the family of Ashtian Barnes – an unarmed man shot and killed by a Harris County, Texas deputy during a 2016 traffic stop – argue that the lower courts applied the wrong legal standard when they ruled the shooting was reasonable. Specifically, the case centers on whether courts assessing an officer’s use of deadly force should focus solely on the “moment of the threat” or consider the “totality of the circumstances” leading up to the use of force. This seemingly technical question carries enormous real-world stakes. How the Supreme Court answers it will influence when police officers can be held liable for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, and it could harmonize a long-standing split among the federal circuits.

This article provides an analysis of Barnes v. Felix for legal professionals and readers who would like to be informed on this important issue. We begin with the legal questions presented and the conflicting standards at issue. We then examine the relevant precedent – from landmark Supreme Court cases like Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner to divergent approaches in the lower courts – to understand how we arrived at this juncture. Next, we discuss how different courts analyze the temporal scope of “reasonableness” in use-of-force cases: should the inquiry zoom in on the split-second of danger, or zoom out to include the officer’s prior actions? Finally, we explore the broader implications of the forthcoming ruling – for constitutional scholars, civil rights litigators, law enforcement agencies, and police training programs – and offer practical takeaways for attorneys and police departments alike.

The Legal Question: “Moment of Threat” vs. “Totality of the Circumstances”

What standard should courts use to judge if an officer’s use of force was excessive under the Fourth Amendment? This is the core question in Barnes v. Felix. Attorneys for the Barnes estate argue that courts must consider all relevant circumstances leading up to the shooting – not just the instant when the officer pulled the trigger. Attorneys for Police Officer Roberto Felix, by contrast, contends that the established doctrine requires focusing on the reasonableness of force “at the moment” it was used, without second-guessing what happened earlier.

This clash boils down to two competing frameworks:

“Moment of the Threat” Doctrine: Under this approach, the court’s excessive-force inquiry is tightly confined to the brief window of time when the officer perceived a direct threat. The question is simply whether, at that precise moment, it was reasonable for the officer to use deadly force to protect themselves or others.

Under this approach, the events preceding that moment – even if the officer’s own actions helped create the danger – are deemed irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis. In the Fifth Circuit decision below, for example, the court held it only mattered that, in the second or two before the shots were fired, Police Officer Felix was clinging to a moving car and feared for his life; how Felix and Barnes reached that perilous situation was not part of the constitutional inquiry

The rationale underlying the Moment of Threat Doctrine is that an officer’s split-second decision under imminent threat should be judged from the on-scene perspective and not distorted by hindsight. Accordingly, the Police Officer points out that this emphasis on the instant of danger aligns with Graham v. Connor’s admonition that reasonableness is judged “at the moment” force is employed and without 20/20 hindsight. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

“Totality of the Circumstances” Standard: This approach, grounded in Graham and other precedent, calls for a holistic assessment of all facts and circumstances leading up to and including the use of force. Rather than freezing the frame at the moment the officer fired shots, a court would examine the entire sequence of events to determine if the officer’s ultimate use of force was objectively reasonable. That includes factors like the severity of the underlying offense, whether the suspect was actively resisting or attempting to flee, and critically, the officer’s own conduct during the encounter.

Under the Totality of Circumstances analysis, for instance, the inquiry would include whether the officer follow proper procedures, issue clear warnings, or escalate the situation unnecessarily? The totality approach doesn’t mean officers get punished for every misstep; instead, it ensures that the reasonableness balancing test accounts for context – including whether the officer’s prior actions unreasonably created the need to use deadly force. Petitioner Barnes argued to the Supreme Court that this is the only way to faithfully apply Graham’s mandate to consider the “totality of the circumstances” in judging Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Narrowing the focus to a single moment, it is contended, conflicts with the Court’s precedents and “ignores relevant facts to the expense of life.”

The stakes of this doctrinal choice are high. This is an important issue to be resolved by a divided Court and a decision that will have real life significant consequences for citizens and law enforcement alike. If the “moment of threat” rule prevails, officers would effectively be judged in a vacuum that excludes how the confrontation evolved – even if an officer’s tactical decisions or mistakes led to the fatal predicament. This overly restrictive standard would effectively provide a complete buffer for what an ordinary citizen might find reasonable in analyzing the shooting death of an unarmed person. If the Court adopts the totality-of-circumstances approach, juries and judges could weigh an officer’s pre-shooting conduct (for example, whether the officer followed training or heedlessly rushed into danger) as part of determining if the force was excessive. In many regards, the Barnes case is about the temporal scope of reasonableness in use-of-force cases.

Should reasonableness be a narrow snapshot, or a panoramic view?

Precedent: Fourth Amendment Standards for Excessive Force

Understanding the Barnes controversy requires examining the Supreme Court’s own excessive force jurisprudence. Two leading cases – Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor – established the baseline rules, though they left some ambiguity that has led to the current split in the lower courts.

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985): In Garner, the Supreme Court struck down a state law that allowed police to use deadly force against any fleeing felony suspect, even if the suspect posed no immediate threat. Memphis police had fatally shot 15-year-old Edward Garner as he ran from a house burglary, despite knowing he was likely unarmed. The Court held that such a “fleeing felon” rule was unconstitutional, articulating a balancing test that underscores what is at stake in deadly force cases. On one side is “the suspect’s fundamental interest in his own life,” an interest that “need not be elaborated upon.” https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/471/1/

Deadly force not only terminates that interest but also “frustrates the interest of the individual, and of society, in judicial determination of guilt and punishment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/490/386/#:~:text=This%20much%20is%20clear%20from,of%20probable%20cause%20to%20arrest.

On the other side of the equation are the government’s interests in effective law enforcement and public safety. In Garner, the Court concluded that the use of deadly force is reasonable only if the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical harm to the officer or others. For example, an officer may be justified in shooting a suspect who is armed or who threatens the officer’s life, but may not shoot an unarmed, non-violent fleeing suspect merely to prevent escape. Garner thus requires case-by-case balancing: even when an officer has probable cause to seize a suspect, killing the suspect is justified only if the government’s interest in using deadly force (such as neutralizing an imminent threat) outweighs the suspect’s life interest and society’s interest in a fair justice process. This decision anchored the principle that deadly force must be a last resort, used only when necessary to prevent grave danger. It also implies that circumstances leading up to the use of force (e.g. the severity of the crime, whether the suspect was armed, etc.) are part of the analysis – a point the Barnes petitioners highlight, arguing that Garner demands consideration of more than the split-second of the shooting.

Graham v. Connor (1989): Graham is the seminal case establishing how all excessive force claims during arrests or investigatory stops are to be analyzed. Graham, a diabetic man, was roughed up by police during a mistaken investigative stop, and he later sued for use of excessive force. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” test governs such claims, and not a substantive due process standard. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/490/386/

Then Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion laid out several key guideposts:

The analysis is objective – the officer’s intentions or motivations (good or bad) are irrelevant. The question is whether a reasonable officer on the scene would consider the force necessary in that situation.
Courts must pay “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each case,” including factors like “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”

These have become known as the Graham factors, and they are non-exhaustive.

The Graham calculation is made considering the totality of those circumstances, as Garner had earlier indicated (quoting Garner’s phrasing that the test is whether “the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of…seizure”).
Crucially, Graham emphasized the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene: The “reasonableness” of force “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Accordingly, police officers often make split-second decisions in tense, rapidly evolving situations, and the law accommodates that by not second-guessing every judgment with perfect hindsight. As the opinion famously noted, “the calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” about the amount of force needed.” 490 U.S. 386, 397.
At the same time, Graham did not hold that only the split-second of force deployment matters. It said the same standard of reasonableness applies “at the moment” of the use of force in the sense that we judge the officer’s decision based on what they knew at that moment, not on information uncovered later or events thereafter. This is a repudiation of a hindsight-based analysis, not an instruction to ignore prior actions by the officer. In fact, Graham reiterated that the inquiry examines all the facts and circumstances confronting the officer – which logically can include the officer’s own conduct leading up to the use of force, so long as those facts would be known to a reasonable officer at the time the trigger was pulled.

Taken together, Garner and Graham establish that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a fact-intensive, context-dependent inquiry balancing the individual’s rights and the government’s needs. Garner illustrates the balancing in the specific scenario of deadly force against fleeing suspects (deadly force is unreasonable unless the suspect poses an immediate serious threat), and Graham generalizes the standard to all police use-of-force: evaluate objective reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances, from the officer’s on-scene perspective, with allowances for split-second decisions.

Notably, neither case explicitly limits the analysis to the literal fraction of a second when force is used – that idea arose later in some lower courts’ interpretations. In fact, Garner’s balancing approach and Graham’s multi-factor test both suggest a broad view of circumstances. In Barnes, the Petitioner seizes on this aspect, arguing that the “moment of threat” doctrine is an “impermissible gloss” that narrows Graham beyond what the Supreme Court has ever required. Respondent Felix, on the other hand, points to Graham’s language about judging reasonableness “at the moment” and not allowing hindsight, contending that this supports a focus on the instant when force was applied.

Thus, the Supreme Court’s task in Barnes v. Felix is essentially to clarify its own precedent: Does Graham’s “totality of the circumstances” test allow consideration of an officer’s pre-shooting conduct (as Barnes argues), or did Graham implicitly mean to freeze the frame at the moment of trigger-pull (as some lower courts have read it)?

Before turning to how different circuit courts have answered that question, it’s worth noting one more Supreme Court case that lurks in the background: County of Los Angeles v. Mendez 581 U.S. 420 (2017) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/581/16-369/ In Mendez, the Court unanimously rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “provocation rule,” which had allowed officers to be held liable for an otherwise reasonable use of force if they provoked the violent confrontation by an independent Fourth Amendment violation. The Supreme Court in Mendez said that was an improper expansion – the correct approach is to analyze the use of force under Graham, considering all relevant circumstances, rather than creating a separate cause of action for pre-seizure provocation.

Importantly, however, Mendez did not forbid considering an officer’s earlier actions within the Graham analysis itself. It simply said if the earlier action was a separate constitutional violation, that claim should be addressed separately (including questions of proximate cause for any resulting harm). In other words, Mendez cautioned against double-counting or circumventing Graham by labeling pre-shooting conduct as “provocation,” but it left intact the idea that the chain of events can be relevant to whether the ultimate use of force was reasonable. efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://journals.law.harvard.edu/crcl/wp-content/uploads/sites/80/2019/03/Balisacan.pdf

The Barnes case squarely raises this issue: all agree Officer Felix’s initial stop of Barnes was lawful, so there’s no separate Fourth Amendment violation prior to the shooting. But Barnes argues Felix’s tactics – drawing his gun, climbing onto a moving car – were objectively unreasonable and made the deadly outcome foreseeable, and thus should be factored into the Graham reasonableness calculus. In contrast, Police Officer Felix argues, in essence, that even if those earlier decisions were poor judgment, they should not be part of the excessive force analysis (though perhaps they could be critiqued elsewhere, say in training or departmental discipline). This debate shows the nuance of applying Graham: everyone agrees on the general test; the dispute is over the temporal framing of what “circumstances” count in the totality.

Divergent Approaches in the Lower Courts: A Nationwide Split

Over the past few decades, the federal courts of appeals have divided sharply on how to apply Graham’s standards in cases of alleged excessive force. Twelve circuits (all but the Federal Circuit, which doesn’t hear police misconduct cases) have weighed in, forming two opposing camps:

Minority View – Focus on the “Moment of the Threat”: Four circuits – the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth – have generally cabined the excessive-force inquiry to the instant when force was used, excluding an officer’s prior conduct from the analysis. In these jurisdictions, courts ask only whether the officer reasonably perceived a sufficient threat at the moment of the shooting. For example, the Fifth Circuit, where Barnes was decided and which governs Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, has repeatedly stated that the excessive force inquiry “is confined to whether the [officer] was in danger at the moment of the threat that resulted in the shooting,” not what the officer did beforehand. In the decision now under review, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Officer Felix by zeroing in on a two-second window: when Barnes’s car began to move with Felix clinging to the side, a reasonable officer could fear being thrown or run over, justifying deadly force in that split-second. The panel expressly deemed it “immaterial” that Officer Felix had drawn his gun and stepped onto the car before Barnes tried to drive off – even if that escalation arguably provoked Barnes’s attempt to flee. This approach treats an officer’s pre-threat actions as irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment question of excessive force.
Similarly, the Second Circuit (covering New York and neighboring states) has held that “any events leading up to” the moment when force is used “are not probative of whether the force used was excessive”, on the theory that those events do not make the officer’s split-second decision any more or less reasonable at the critical instant. Cowan ex rel. Estate of Cooper v. Breen, 352 F.3d 756, 762 (2d Cir. 2003) https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/cowan-ex-rel-estate-894558528
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have taken similar positions in their case law.

Proponents of this temporally narrow view argue it provides a clear, manageable rule: the court essentially performs a freeze-frame analysis – was the officer or someone else in imminent peril right before the trigger was pulled? If yes, lethal force is deemed reasonable; if not, it’s excessive. This approach, they contend, sticks to Graham’s instruction to avoid hindsight bias: by not “Monday-morning-quarterbacking” the officer’s earlier decisions, courts avoid imposing unrealistically calm judgments on. It also aligns with self-defense principles – focusing on the instant of threat mirrors how one evaluates any individual’s defensive use of force (i.e. was it necessary then and there?).

However, the “moment of threat” doctrine has drawn increasing criticism, even from judges in these minority view circuits. In the Barnes case, Fifth Circuit Judge Patrick Higginbotham followed circuit precedent to rule for the officer but wrote a separate concurring opinion to voice his misgivings. He described the doctrine as “starv[ing] the reasonableness analysis by ignoring relevant facts to the expense of life.” In Judge Higginbotham’s view, limiting the inquiry to a blink of time “lessens the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the American public”, especially as it often forecloses relief whenever an officer can say they felt endangered in the final seconds of an encounter . The judge openly urged the Supreme Court to resolve this issue, noting that the rule is “deployed daily across this country” with significant consequences. Barnes v. Felix, 91 F.4th 393 (5th Cir. 2024). https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-20519/22-20519-2024-01-23.html

Similar reservations have been echoed elsewhere – for instance, some judges worry that moment-of-threat approach effectively immunizes officers who may have acted unreasonably up until the moment of fear, and that it disincentivizes de-escalation. We will discuss these concerns further in the implications section, but it’s important to recognize that even within the minority camp, there is discomfort about the rigidity of the rule.

Majority View – Consider the Totality of Circumstances (Including Pre-Shooting Conduct): The other eight regional circuits – the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit – reject the moment-of-threat limitation and apply Graham’s totality-of-circumstances test in a broader way. Courts in these jurisdictions permit factfinders to weigh an officer’s actions leading up to the use of force as part of the reasonableness inquiry. This doesn’t mean that an officer’s poor decisions automatically make a shooting unconstitutional; rather, it means the court isn’t blind to how the deadly confrontation came about. For example, the Tenth Circuit held in Sevier v. City of Lawrence that “the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct depends in part on whether the officer’s own reckless or deliberate actions unreasonably created the need to use deadly force”. In that case, officers responding to a man with a knife rushed in and provoked a fatal confrontation; the court allowed a jury to consider whether the officers had unnecessarily escalated the situation, making the subsequent shooting unreasonable. https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-10th-circuit/1573268.html
The Third Circuit in Abraham v. Raso similarly ruled that an officer who stepped in front of a slow-moving car and then shot the driver could be found to have used excessive force – even though at the moment of firing she was in the car’s path – because it was her own movement into danger that precipitated the need to shoot. Under a totality approach, the fact that the officer placed herself in peril (when safer tactics were available) is relevant to determining if the force was excessive. https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-3rd-circuit/1147913.html The Ninth Circuit and others have embraced this reasoning as well.

In sum, the majority view allows consideration of whether the officer “created the danger” or could have defused the situation, as one factor in the overall balance. It’s a more nuanced, all-things-considered analysis: the moment of the threat is still highly relevant (indeed, it often carries great weight – if an officer truly faces an armed suspect, that will usually justify force), but it is not exclusively determinative. Proponents of the totality approach argue that it is more faithful to Graham and Garner. The Supreme Court said “careful attention” must be paid to all facts of the encounter, and that the ultimate question is whether the entire seizure was reasonable. Ignoring the lead-up would mean ignoring potentially critical facts – such as whether the suspect was actually threatening or trying to surrender – which could make the difference between reasonable and excessive force. Moreover, this view holds police to a standard similar to ordinary tort principles of causation and fault: if an officer’s unreasonable conduct produces the necessity to use force, that should not be washed out of the analysis. As one commentator put it, officers should not be allowed to “create the need for deadly force” and then escape liability by pointing only to the danger of the moment. On the flip side, totality-minded judges note that if the officer truly had no reasonable alternative and did nothing blameworthy beforehand, considering the full chain of events will still vindicate the officer’s actions as reasonable. In Barnes, Respondent Felix concedes that even under totality of circumstances, the moment an officer experiences a threat will usually predominate the analysis when lethal force is used. The point is that Graham’s factors inherently focus on immediacy of threat – but the dispute is whether only that immediacy can be considered or whether it’s just one crucial factor among many. The majority circuits treat it as one factor.

This clear split – 4 circuits on one side, 8 on the other – has caused inconsistent outcomes in police shooting cases nationwide. As an illustrative example, consider a scenario that unfortunately recurs in police litigation: an officer shoots at a suspect driving away in a vehicle, claiming he fired out of fear of being struck by the car. In a “moment of threat” jurisdiction, the court might grant qualified immunity or summary judgment for the officer by focusing narrowly on whether the officer was in the car’s path at the moment of the shot. But in a totality of circumstances jurisdiction, the court might ask additional questions: How did the officer end up in front of the car? Could he have moved out of the way? Was the suspect’s car moving fast or slow? Were there other officers or civilians in danger? If the evidence showed, for instance, that the officer stepped in front of the car when he could have stayed safe to the side, a jury could conclude the shooting was unreasonable – something that the moment-of-threat rule might preclude. This divergence has real impacts on plaintiffs’ ability to get their day in court. Judge Higginbotham noted in Barnes that the choice of standard will “frequently determine whether there was a Fourth Amendment excessive force violation in the first place.”

In practical terms, the minority rule often leads courts to dismiss cases at the summary judgment stage, as happened to Barnes’s lawsuit, whereas the majority rule more often sends the question of reasonableness to a jury (especially when there are disputes about what happened leading up to the shooting). Given this deep divide, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve it. Both the trial judge and the Fifth Circuit in Barnes practically invited the high court to step in. Judge Higginbotham’s concurrence explicitly called for Supreme Court guidance, and even the district court had expressed that its hands were tied by the Fifth Circuit’s doctrine. Now that the issue is before the Justices, all eyes are on how they will reconcile these approaches.

**The Barnes Case: Facts and Procedural History, Overview**

Barnes v. Felix arose from a tragic encounter on April 28, 2016, in Harris County, Texas. The essential facts, drawn from the lower court record (including dash-cam video), provide a human context to the abstract legal debate:

Initial Stop: Officer Roberto Felix, a county constable’s deputy, pulled over 24-year-old Ashtian Barnes for a minor traffic issue – his car had outstanding toll road violations (unpaid tolls). This was a routine daytime stop for a non-violent infraction. Felix asked Barnes for his driver’s license and insurance; Barnes did not have them on hand, explaining the car was a rental. Felix smelled marijuana and continued to question Barnes.
Escalation of the Encounter: Barnes remained seated in the car and, at Felix’s request, used the remote release to pop open the trunk (ostensibly to look for his information). Felix then instructed Barnes to exit the vehicle. Barnes cracked the driver’s door open but did not step out immediately. Around this time, the car’s left turn signal came on – indicating the ignition might have been turned back on (a point of dispute). Sensing potential flight, Felix drew his firearm and shouted “Don’t f***ing move!” at Barnes. He even stepped onto the running board/door sill of the car, gun trained on Barnes’s head, physically shoving Barnes’s head to the side with the weapon. In that fraught moment, the car lurched forward. Barnes had indeed put the car in drive (perhaps panicking at the drawn gun). Felix was now hanging partially inside the open driver’s door as the car began to move.
The Shooting: As the vehicle started rolling, Officer Felix fired two gunshots into the car at very close range. He later admitted he fired blindly, without a clear view of Barnes’s body, because he feared being thrown from the car and run over. Both shots struck Barnes. The car quickly came to a stop a short distance down the road, with Felix still clinging on. Barnes was gravely wounded. Within minutes, paramedics pronounced Barnes dead at the scene. He was unarmed, and the only alleged “crime” at issue was the traffic violation and possible minor contraband.
Aftermath: A grand jury declined to indict Officer Felix on any criminal charges. The Harris County Sheriff’s Office concluded Felix hadn’t violated policy, as it accepted his claim that he feared for his life in the split-second when the car moved. In 2017, Barnes’s family filed a civil lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Felix used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The suit also included claims against Harris County (arguing improper training/policies) and state-law claims, but the focus has always been on the constitutionality of Felix’s actions.
Lower Court Decisions: The case was removed to federal court, and after discovery, Felix and the County moved for summary judgment. In 2021, the U.S. District Court (Judge Alfred Bennett) ruled in the defendants’ favor, granting summary judgment. Judge Bennett found that, viewing the dash-cam video and facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, no reasonable jury could find Felix’s use of force was excessive. The court applied the Fifth Circuit’s “moment of threat” rule, reasoning that at the moment Felix fired the shots, he was in danger (dangling from a moving car) and thus the shooting was objectively reasonable. The judge explicitly noted he was not allowed to consider Felix’s prior actions in the analysis, per circuit precedent. Barnes’s parents appealed to the Fifth Circuit. In January 2024, a three-judge panel affirmed the judgment. Judge Higginbotham’s opinion agreed that under controlling law, only the immediate threat to Felix’s safety could be considered – and in that sliver of time, Barnes’s act of driving off with Felix on the side posed a lethal danger justifying deadly force. In a remarkable concurrence, Judge Higginbotham wrote separately to criticize the very rule he had just applied, calling it an “impermissible gloss” on Graham and stressing that the full context (including Felix’s decision to jump onto the car) might well render the force excessive if it could be considered. He urged either the Fifth Circuit en banc or the Supreme Court to abandon the “moment of threat” doctrine.
Supreme Court Review: Barnes’ mother petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted on October 4, 2024. The case was argued on January 22, 2025. Notably, by the time of Supreme Court briefing, even the Respondents (Felix and the State of Texas, which intervened as amicus supporting him) shifted their stance somewhat. They argued that the Fifth Circuit’s analysis could be viewed as consistent with a totality-of-circumstances approach – asserting that all relevant circumstances were considered, but that circumstances prior to the threat were simply not “relevant” under Fourth Amendment law. In effect, they reframed the issue: rather than overtly defending a strict “moment of threat only” rule, they suggested that earlier events (like Felix’s climbing on the car) should carry little to no weight in the reasonableness balance. This hairsplitting did not appear to gain traction with the Justices, as we’ll see below.

With the factual background and legal conflict established, we turn now to what happened at the Supreme Court and what outcome may be likely.

Signals from the Supreme Court: Oral Argument and Likely Outcome

Though you cannot read too much into oral arguments and the Justices’ questions and comments, the exchanges in Barnes v. Felix strongly hinted at the Court’s leaning. During the January 22, 2025 argument, several Justices across the ideological spectrum expressed skepticism toward the “moment of threat” doctrine, suggesting that the Court is inclined to reject the Fifth Circuit’s narrow approach. Justice Sonia Sotomayor immediately pressed the attorney for Officer Felix on whether the lower courts had truly applied a totality-of-circumstances review. When the attorney insisted they had, Sotomayor asked him to point to anywhere in the Fifth Circuit opinion that even uses the phrase “totality of the circumstances.” He conceded, “I cannot.”

This pointed questioning underscored that the Fifth Circuit explicitly limited its gaze. Justices Ketanji Brown Jackson and Elena Kagan followed up, drawing a crucial distinction: the question is not whether pre-shooting conduct automatically makes an officer liable, but whether judges are allowed to consider it at all. Justice Jackson observed that the “moment of the threat” doctrine, as understood by everyone, “is about evidence” – i.e. what evidence (of earlier conduct) a court may look at in deciding a Fourth Amendment claim. By contrast, deciding how much weight to give that evidence is a separate matter of judgment in each case. Jackson suggested that Felix’s argument was conflating these issues: of course, an officer’s earlier actions might not outweigh an immediate threat, but that doesn’t mean the law forbids even looking at them. Justice Kagan echoed that the case was about “the question of what weight to give the fact that the officer may have created the danger,” which is different from a rule excluding such facts altogether. These comments indicate the Court’s liberal justices saw the Fifth Circuit’s doctrine as an evidentiary blindfold inconsistent with Graham.

On the conservative side of the bench, only Justice Brett Kavanaugh actively voiced concerns aligned with the respondent’s position. Justice Kavanaugh posed a hypothetical drawn from the facts: “Are officers always prohibited at traffic stops, when the car pulls away, from jumping on the car?” He mused that routine traffic stops sometimes lead to catching serious criminals, and worried that if officers are taught they’ll be second-guessed for how they react, they might let dangerous people escape. Specifically, he fretted that abandoning the moment-of-threat focus could force officers into an untenable choice between “letting go of a moving car, knowing that this person could do serious harm” or, as Felix did, clinging on and then possibly having to use force. This line of questioning reflects a classic concern: that courts might too readily second-guess split-second decisions and thereby hamper effective policing. Kavanaugh’s perspective was sympathetic to the idea that an officer shouldn’t lose a justified self-defense claim “simply because he erred in the past” (a point Felix’s counsel also made in briefs). However, it’s noteworthy that Kavanaugh appeared to be in the minority with this viewpoint at argument. No other Justice plainly adopted that hardline stance in the discussion that we know of.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Solicitor General’s office, participating as amicus curiae supporting neither party (though effectively supporting vacating the Fifth Circuit decision), argued for a middle ground: affirm Graham’s totality-of-circumstances test while cautioning that an officer’s pre-threat conduct should be considered only to the extent it’s proximate to the need for force. In practice, the Solicitor General urged the Court to say the Fifth Circuit’s rule was too restrictive and to remand for the proper standard, without spelling out a detailed algorithm for every scenario. This position likely resonated with several Justices looking for a narrow resolution. https://loganhockingtimes.com/supreme-court-appears-ready-to-revive-use-of-force-case-over-deadly-harris-county-deputy-shooting/

By the end of argument, court watchers widely perceived that a majority of the Justices were inclined to rule in favor of Barnes (the plaintiff) – at least to the extent of disapproving the “moment of threat” doctrine and giving her a chance to prove her case under a broader standard. Even the Chief Justice and Justice Amy Coney Barrett (whose questions were more measured) seemed to acknowledge that Graham’s text says “totality of the circumstances,” and that lower courts should not categorically ignore part of the story in excessive force cases. No Justice openly defended the Fifth Circuit’s exact approach, and, tellingly, the respondents themselves disavowed a strict moment-only rule by the time of argument (instead trying to say everything before the moment was “irrelevant,” which as noted did not land well). https://ballsandstrikes.org/scotus/barnes-felix-oral-argument-recap/

Likely Outcome: Based on the Justices’ reactions and the briefing, the Supreme Court may very well reject the narrow “moment of the threat” doctrine. And, it seems probable that a decision vacating the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and holding that the proper framework for analyzing these 1983 cases will incorporate the totality of the circumstances test as articulated in Graham. Certainly, the Court will be on sound jurisprudential ground by holding that courts may consider an officer’s actions leading up to the use of force as part of the reasonableness assessment – particularly if those actions directly contributed to the eventual need to use force.

In practical terms, this would mean remanding the Barnes case for a fresh analysis (or trial) under the correct standard, where a jury could weigh whether Felix’s jumping onto the car was itself unreasonable under the circumstances (e.g., given that Barnes was unarmed and it was a minor stop) and if so, whether that makes the shooting unreasonable when viewing the incident as a whole. The Court is likely to stop short of outright declaring Felix’s conduct unconstitutional – instead, they will set the standard and let the lower courts apply it to the facts.

We might see something like a 7-2 or 8-1 split in the Justices’ votes. Justice Kavanaugh, and perhaps one or two others, could write a concurrence or partial dissent emphasizing the challenges police face and cautioning that officers shouldn’t be unduly second-guessed. But it appears there is broad agreement (even among several conservative justices) that the Fifth Circuit’s rule cannot be squared with the Court’s precedents. Even Justice Samuel Alito – often a voice for law enforcement – in past cases has acknowledged that Graham calls for examining all circumstances, and he might concur if the opinion is written narrowly. The decision will likely be penned in a careful tone, reassuring that Graham’s deference to officers’ on-scene judgments remains intact, while clarifying that “on-scene” does not mean “one instant in time.” Put differently, the Court can affirm that judges must view the situation as a reasonable officer would – which includes how the officer got to that moment of peril, not just the peril itself.

Notably, Professor Sheldon Nahmod, a prominent constitutional scholar, initially expected the conservative-majority Court to stick with a pro-law enforcement stance, but after reading the oral argument transcript he “changed [his] prediction” – now foreseeing a relatively narrow decision rejecting the moment-of-threat approach and adopting the totality-of-circumstances approach, making an officer’s conduct in bringing about the use of deadly force a factor in determining reasonableness. https://nahmodlaw.com/2025/01/23/an-important-section-1983-fourth-amendment-deadly-force-case-barnes-v-felix-in-the-supreme-court/ This reflects the consensus of many court watchers. The ruling is anticipated by June 2025, and when it comes, it will establish a uniform standard for all courts to follow.

Broader Implications of the Court’s Ruling

A Supreme Court decision in Barnes v. Felix will reverberate far beyond the specific parties. By settling the standard for excessive force claims, the Court will influence how future cases are litigated, how police are trained, and how scholars theorize the balance between public safety and individual rights. We examine the implications for several key groups and offer some actionable insights:

Implications for Legal Scholars and Constitutional Theorists

For constitutional law scholars, a ruling in Barnes will be a significant development in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. If the Court indeed embraces the totality of the circumstances approach, it will be seen as a reaffirmation of Graham and Garner in their broadest sense – clarifying that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard demands a comprehensive fact-sensitive inquiry, not a blinkered snapshot. This has theoretical implications: it aligns with the view that the Fourth Amendment was designed foremost to protect citizens from unreasonable state violence, rather than to give police simplified safe harbors. Scholars may note that the Court’s decision (especially if it references the common law of self-defense or arrest) brings modern doctrine closer to historical norms. At common law, courts assessed an officer’s use of deadly force by examining the entire encounter, including whether the officer properly announced themselves, whether the suspect was actually dangerous, and whether the officer’s actions were necessary or provoked. A totality-of-circumstances rule is consistent with those factors, whereas the “moment of threat” concept is a modern judicial creation.

We can expect law review commentary on how Barnes impacts the so-called “state-created danger” theory in Fourth Amendment contexts. By allowing consideration of pre-seizure conduct, the Court is essentially saying that if an officer affirmatively worsens the situation (even without committing an independent constitutional violation), that fact can’t be ignored. Some theorists will applaud this as injecting more moral accountability into Fourth Amendment analysis – ensuring that courts don’t turn a blind eye to how an encounter unfolded. Others might critique it, asking whether the Fourth Amendment is the proper vehicle for policing tactical decisions or whether such matters should be left to negligence law or internal discipline. The Court’s reasoning in Barnes will likely address this by emphasizing the constitutional dimension of seizures: since the ultimate seizure (e.g., shooting a person) is evaluated for reasonableness, everything that is part of that seizure’s context is fair game.

If the Court rules as expected, scholars will also examine how this decision interacts with qualified immunity. One notable practical point: even if more excessive force claims survive summary judgment on the constitutional question (because plaintiffs can point to an officer’s unreasonable conduct earlier in the encounter), officers might still invoke qualified immunity to avoid liability unless the law was “clearly established.” However, Barnes will itself clearly establish the new standard going forward. Professor Nahmod, for instance, highlighted that qualified immunity will continue to protect officers who violate the Fourth Amendment unless prior case law clearly proscribed their specific conduct. After Barnes, one can expect the “clearly established law” prong to incorporate this decision, meaning future plaintiffs can cite Barnes v. Felix to defeat immunity in cases where officers unreasonably created the need for force.

In the broader constitutional theory context, the decision will likely spark discussion about the proper role of the courts in supervising police conduct. A move away from the moment-of-threat doctrine could be viewed as a modest shift toward greater judicial scrutiny of police actions – effectively a recalibration toward protecting individuals’ rights in police encounters. This comes at a time of intense public debate over police accountability. Scholars might situate Barnes alongside other recent developments (such as discussions to reform qualified immunity or the Court’s 2020 decision in Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7 (2020) nudging the boundaries of immunity) as evidence that the Supreme Court is responding, albeit cautiously, to concerns about unchecked police power. Constitutional theorists who argue the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted in light of its Framers’ intent to curb abusive government force will find support in a totality-of-circumstances rule. https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-135/taylor-v-riojas/ Those who favor bright-line rules to guide law enforcement may worry that the law just became murkier. Either way, Barnes v. Felix will be studied in criminal procedure and constitutional law courses as a pivotal case clarifying how we define “reasonable” force.

For Civil Rights Litigators: Be prepared to order the updated treatises, casebooks, and articles that will reflect that the Supreme Court has resolved the circuit split. The phrase “moment of the threat” may become a historical footnote – an example of a doctrine explicitly disapproved by the Court. Scholars should also watch how lower courts implement the decision on remand and in analogous cases: does it lead to more cases going to juries? How do judges handle the nuance of weighing pre-shooting conduct? These questions will offer rich ground for empirical research and theoretical evaluation of Fourth Amendment enforcement.

For us attorneys who represent plaintiffs in police misconduct cases (and for § 1983 litigation in general), a Barnes decision favoring the totality of circumstances standard will be a significant win. It will directly impact litigation strategy in several ways:

Easier Path Past Summary Judgment: In jurisdictions that previously followed the “moment of threat” rule, plaintiffs often faced an uphill battle to avoid summary judgment. No matter how egregious the officer’s prior actions, cases could be tossed if the court found that at the instant of shooting the officer faced a potential threat. After Barnes, those courts must consider the full timeline. This means that in cases with disputed facts about what the suspect was doing and what the officer did, judges are more likely to let juries decide the reasonableness question. Civil rights litigators should be ready to marshal evidence of the entire encounter: videos, witness testimony, expert analysis of police tactics, etc., to show a jury the context. The narrative matters more than ever – you’re no longer confined to a single freeze-frame. For instance, Barnes’s counsel on remand will highlight that Ashtian Barnes was compliant up until he saw a gun pointed at his head, and that Felix escalated the situation quickly. Such context could persuade a jury that the shooting was not a reasonable last resort but a result of the officer’s poor judgment.
Expanded Discovery and Expert Use: With courts allowing inquiry into pre-shooting conduct, expect more discovery focused on officer training, decision-making, and department policies. Plaintiffs’ lawyers will dig into why the officer chose a particular tactic: Did the officer have other options? What do training materials say about jumping on moving cars or using force in such situations? Already, expert witnesses like use-of-force instructors or criminologists (such as Professor Seth Stoughton, who filed an amicus brief in Barnes) can explain how a reasonable officer should behave in a scenario and whether Felix’s actions deviated from standard practice. These experts become even more relevant when the analysis isn’t artificially truncated. Lawyers should line up experts who can speak to police procedure leading up to shootings – e.g., was it reasonable to approach a suspect the way the officer did, or to fail to wait for backup, etc. This shifts some focus from just the split-second “shoot/don’t-shoot” decision to the tactical conduct of officers.
Racial Disparities and Contextual Evidence: Many civil rights litigators will incorporate broader contextual evidence, where relevant, about patterns of enforcement. For example, if a case involves a minor infraction leading to a deadly force incident, lawyers might highlight how such stops disproportionately affect minorities and how an officer’s implicit biases or departmental culture might have contributed. In Barnes, advocacy groups noted that “low-level traffic stops disproportionately affect minority communities” and that doctrines overly protective of police can have “a disproportionate potential to harm Black and Hispanic drivers.”

While a court might not let in all such evidence, a totality approach is conceptually open to considering whether an officer’s fear was reasonable in light of all circumstances – potentially including whether any unfounded fear or escalation was influenced by bias. At minimum, the removal of the moment-of-threat straitjacket lets plaintiffs argue these points.

Settlement Leverage: With more cases surviving to trial, police departments and municipalities may be more inclined to settle credible claims. The risk of a jury verdict (and potentially large damages or precedential decisions) can motivate reform and compensation. Civil rights lawyers should use this leverage to push for not just monetary relief but sometimes policy changes in settlement agreements (e.g., a department agreeing to revise its use-of-force policy or training).

Of course, it’s important to temper expectations: even under a totality standard, many police shootings will still be deemed reasonable. Officers will continue to prevail in cases where, say, a suspect clearly threatened deadly harm and the officer’s prior conduct was not obviously wrong. And qualified immunity remains a formidable defense – though Barnes will clearly establish the law moving forward, officers might still claim immunity for incidents that occurred pre-Barnes if their circuit law previously favored them. For example, if another Fifth Circuit case from 2023 is pending on appeal, the officers there might say, “We relied on the old rule, and the law wasn’t clearly established otherwise.” But looking ahead, civil rights litigators may soon have a Supreme Court stamp of approval to argue the full story of what happened in an encounter.

Actionable suggestions for litigators: Start by updating your pleadings to explicitly invoke the Barnes standard – plead facts about the officer’s entire course of conduct, not just the moment of force. In opposing summary judgment, cite Barnes v. Felix (once decided) for the proposition that a jury is entitled to consider the officer’s tactical decisions. Develop a timeline exhibit for the jury that shows each key moment (this can powerfully illustrate, for example, that only X seconds elapsed from a calm situation to shots fired, due perhaps to the officer’s sudden aggressive move). Also, invest in expert witnesses who can contextualize an officer’s choices against accepted police practices – their testimony can directly support or undermine the reasonableness of those choices in the totality analysis. Lastly, collaborate with organizations that submitted amicus briefs (like the Cato Institute, NACDL, or civil rights groups) as they often have deep research on these issues. Their perspectives might help shape discovery requests or trial themes (for instance, data on how often officers who create a danger end up using force, etc.). The bottom line is that Barnes gives litigators a doctrinal green light to hold law enforcement accountable for the lead-up as well as the climax of violent encounters.

Implications for Law Enforcement Agencies and Officers

Police departments and officers on the street will have to take heed of the Supreme Court’s ruling. While the case will mostly affect how courts review incidents after the fact, it inevitably will filter into police practices and policies. Here are key implications and some practical guidance for law enforcement leadership:

Policy and Procedure Revisions: Departments in jurisdictions that had been following the moment-of-threat doctrine might need to revise their use-of-force policies to reflect the new legal reality. For instance, some departments informally told officers that as long as they can articulate a threat at the instant of firing, they would be legally protected. That advice is too simplistic now. Agencies should emphasize that all aspects of an officer’s conduct will be scrutinized if a use of force is challenged. This doesn’t mean officers can’t act – it means they should follow training and policy at every step, because courts will be looking at whether they did so. Policies might be updated to explicitly prohibit certain dangerous tactics except as a last resort. In fact, many progressive police departments already ban or strongly discourage shooting at moving vehicles or climbing onto them, precisely because such actions create extreme danger. In light of Barnes, departments without such policies should consider implementing them. An officer jumping on a car hood to prevent escape might soon be viewed as a textbook example of what not to do unless absolutely necessary. Departments could reference the Barnes case in roll-call training, saying: “The Supreme Court has said if you unnecessarily put yourself in danger, that can make an otherwise clean shoot into a problematic one.” The message: Think before you rush in.
Training Emphasis on De-Escalation and Tactics: Perhaps the biggest practical change should be in training (which we address more fully in the next section), which would be a net benefit for everyone across the board. From a department leadership perspective, the implication is clear: better-trained officers = less liability under a totality standard. If officers are trained to handle situations without resorting to creating a deadly confrontation, they are more likely to be found to have acted reasonably. Law enforcement agencies should double down on training in de-escalation, scenario-based exercises, and tactical decision-making under stress. The Barnes case highlights that an officer’s split-second decisions will be judged in context – so give officers the tools to make those decisions wisely. For example, training should reinforce concepts like: do not approach a suspect’s vehicle in a way that puts you at risk of being dragged; use cover and backup when available; clearly communicate with suspects to reduce misunderstandings. If such principles are ingrained, officers are less likely to find themselves in the precarious “dangling off a car” situation to begin with. In effect, Barnes incentivizes agencies to avoid creating the conditions of chaos in which split-second deadly force becomes necessary. That is aligned with best practices for officer safety too – staying safe often means not putting oneself in extreme peril if it can be avoided.
Liability and Insurance Considerations: Municipalities and police departments (and their insurers) should prepare for the possibility of increased civil liability in the short term. As discussed, more cases may reach a jury, and some may result in plaintiff verdicts in scenarios that previously would have been thrown out. This can affect budgets and risk management. Some states indemnify officers for judgments; others require officers to carry insurance. In any case, agencies have a financial and reputational incentive to reduce excessive force incidents. The ruling in Barnes could be used as a justification to secure funding for better training programs or less-lethal equipment – city councils might be more willing to invest in these if it means fewer lawsuits. On the flip side, agencies might encounter morale issues or concerns from officers who fear that they will be “second-guessed” more often. Police unions and some officers are likely to initially view the decision as a negative, worrying about “liability on Monday for split-second decisions made on Friday.” It will be incumbent on police leadership to communicate the reality: Barnes doesn’t mean officers will be held liable for every mistake – it means obvious mistakes can’t be ignored. Officers still have legal protections, and juries tend to be sympathetic to the pressures officers face when the officers act reasonably.
Retention and Recruitment: One argument raised by the States supporting Felix was that making lawsuits easier could worsen the current challenges in police recruitment and retention. They fear officers will do their jobs in constant fear of being sued, leading to either overly cautious policing or an exodus from the profession. While these concerns shouldn’t be dismissed, the reality of Barnes is likely more measured. The standard of objective reasonableness remains – officers who follow their training and act as reasonable officers won’t suddenly be liable. It’s critical that law enforcement agencies convey this in training and internal messaging: “If you act as you are trained and within policy, the courts will still protect you. We are just eliminating a technicality that might have shielded a truly reckless action. Good policing doesn’t become illegal; bad policing doesn’t get a free pass.” Furthermore, qualified immunity still provides a robust defense except in truly obvious cases. So, the practical effect may be less dire than some fear. Over time, if departments adapt properly, Barnes could actually improve community trust (since the public sees a mechanism for accountability) and thereby improve officer safety and legitimacy.

Practical steps for police departments: In the wake of the ruling, chiefs and sheriffs should issue a bulletin or conduct briefings explaining the decision to their officers in plain terms. Emphasize that safety tactics and de-escalation are not just about avoiding harm – they also protect the officer legally. For example: “If you wait for backup instead of rushing in alone, and the situation is resolved without force, you avoid not only danger but also liability. If force becomes necessary, the fact that you followed training and used restraint will be your strongest defense in court.” Departments should review their use-of-force reports and investigation protocols too. Internal investigators (and any civilian review boards) might broaden their analysis to examine the pre-shooting conduct, which can align internal accountability with the new legal standard. Finally, sharing information across agencies is useful: police executives can look at model policies (for instance, some agencies prohibit shooting from or at moving vehicles unless absolutely unavoidable – such policies are very relevant to Barnes type scenarios). Implementing such policies now not only reduces the chance of tragic outcomes but also positions the agency defensively if a lawsuit arises – being able to say “the officer violated our clear policy by jumping on the car” both supports discipline and potentially limits the agency’s legal exposure.

Implications for Police Training Programs

Police training academies and continuing education programs are the frontline for translating legal rules into everyday practice. A change in the legal standard like this should directly inform training curricula going forward. Here’s what training units should focus on:

Scenario-Based Training on Use of Force Continuum: Trainers should incorporate scenarios similar to the Barnes incident into their programs to teach officers how to handle them better. For example, a scenario of a traffic stop where a driver is non-compliant could be used to train tactical patience and positioning. Rather than immediately reaching into a vehicle or hopping on a running car, officers can be taught alternative tactics (such as backing off and treating the situation as a pursuit, calling for air support, etc., if the offense is minor). After Barnes, scenario debriefs should explicitly discuss not just officer safety but also legal reasonableness: “What could the officer have done differently to avoid needing to shoot? If this scenario went to court, what factors would they consider?” By doing this, officers begin to internalize that their entire set of actions will be judged. This can reinforce good habits: for instance, taking cover and issuing loud verbal commands is both safer and will look more reasonable later than charging in and escalating.
Integrating De-Escalation Training: In recent years, many departments have put a new emphasis on de-escalation techniques – communication skills, time-and-distance tactics, Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) approaches for people in crisis, etc. The Barnes decision provides further impetus to integrate these into standard training. Officers should be repeatedly trained that using time, cover, and communication can mitigate a threat without force, and if force becomes necessary, having attempted de-escalation will strongly favor them in the totality of circumstances. For example, an officer confronting a potentially uncooperative driver could keep a safer distance and talk the suspect down rather than immediately resorting to force. If a shooting still occurs, the fact that the officer tried and couldn’t de-escalate is a circumstance that will support the reasonableness of the action. Training should include role-playing exercises where officers practice slowing down and managing their adrenaline in high-stress encounters – this is crucial because many “bad” outcomes happen when officers get caught in an action-reaction loop without pausing to consider options. The scenario in Barnes escalated within seconds; training can instill the mindset to slow the situation when possible.
Legal Updates in Training Manuals: Academies should update their legal instruction modules to cover Barnes v. Felix. Recruit and in-service training often includes a review of pertinent Supreme Court cases (like Graham, Garner, etc.). Barnes will join that list. Instructors must explain the new standard: “We used to teach that the moment of the threat is key – and it still is crucial – but now courts will also ask whether you got yourself into that situation unnecessarily.” Providing concrete examples will help; e.g., “If you corner a suspect in a way that gives you no choice but to shoot, was that cornering necessary? If not, your use of force might be deemed excessive even if you felt threatened at the final moment.” This doesn’t undermine the need to protect oneself; it underscores the need to set oneself up for success by controlling the encounter smartly.
Documentation and Body Camera Training: With the totality of circumstances in play, what officers say and do in the lead-up will be evidence in court. Training should reinforce good communication (giving clear commands, warnings before shooting if feasible, etc.) and proper reporting after the fact. Officers should articulate in their reports not just “I shot because I was in fear,” but also what led to that point and any efforts they made to avoid it. Body-worn cameras are vital – instructors should remind officers to ensure their cameras are activated, because a video showing an officer calmly trying to resolve a situation before using force can be the difference between a finding of reasonableness and liability. Conversely, footage showing an officer needlessly escalating will be Exhibit A for the plaintiff. Therefore, train officers that the camera is your ally when you handle things well. Some agencies already review bodycam footage to give officers feedback on tactics; incorporating Barnes into those review sessions could highlight where an officer might have unnecessarily rushed a scenario.
After-action Review Culture: Beyond initial training, departments should cultivate an internal culture of after-action reviews for use-of-force incidents that goes beyond “Was the shooting justified at the moment?” to “Could this outcome have been avoided with different tactics?” Many progressive departments do this in a non-punitive way (sometimes called Sentinel Event Reviews or similar). By analyzing incidents holistically, agencies learn and officers learn. Now that the legal standard aligns with this holistic view, such reviews take on added importance. Training divisions can take lessons learned from these reviews (e.g., if an incident showed an officer didn’t follow training and it led to a bad outcome) and feed it back into academy scenarios or in-service training bulletins.

Actionable takeaway for trainers: Update lesson plans and slides to include the key quote from Barnes once available (for instance, if the opinion says, “courts may consider whether the officer’s own conduct unreasonably contributed to the need for force”). Use it to remind officers that their conduct will be judged in its entirety. Encourage a mindset of “constitutional policing” where officer safety and civilian safety are both maximized by good tactics. For example, trainers might say: “It’s not just about whether you can justify pulling the trigger in a split second; it’s about whether you made choices that put you or others in a position where deadly force became inevitable. The best outcome is one where you never have to shoot because you handled it in a way that didn’t force that outcome.” In practical drills, after an exercise, explicitly ask the trainee: “What did you do to try to control the situation before using force? Could something else have worked?” This reflection ties directly into what courts will be asking after Barnes. By ingraining these considerations in training, police academies will produce officers who instinctively consider the long view – which should lead to safer outcomes for both officers and civilians, and fewer legal problems down the line.

Conclusion

Barnes v. Felix stands to be one of the most consequential Supreme Court decisions on police use of force in years. At its heart, the case is about aligning legal doctrine with common sense: can we truly judge the reasonableness of a police officer’s actions without looking at the whole picture? The likely answer from the Court – a resounding “no” – will bring the minority of circuits into line with the majority, ensuring that the Fourth Amendment’s promise against unreasonable seizures is given full effect rather than being truncated to a mere blink in time. For legal professionals, the decision will provide much-needed clarity. Lawyers will adjust their strategies, judges will adapt their jury instructions, and scholars will add a new chapter to the story of how constitutional law evolves in response to societal and judicial dialogue.

Beyond the courtroom, a clear message may emerge: police officers are accountable for the entirety of their conduct in confrontations with the public, not just the final trigger pull. From the perspective of community members and civil rights advocates, this is a step toward justice – it means courts can no longer ignore potentially reckless or aggressive police behavior that puts lives at risk. From the perspective of diligent law enforcement officers, this standard is nothing to fear – good officers already strive to handle encounters reasonably from start to finish, and the law will continue to protect those split-second decisions that are truly unavoidable and necessary. In fact, a uniform standard can improve trust, because it shows that the legal system values both officer safety and civilian lives by examining all the facts.

In practical terms, Barnes invites police leadership and training programs to double-down on comprehensive risk management: every tactical decision is part of the risk calculus, both on the street and in court later. By implementing the lessons from this case – emphasizing de-escalation, smart tactics, and thorough documentation – police agencies can reduce needless violence and also shield their officers from liability. As one amicus curiae noted, when victims of police deadly force have no chance for their story to be heard because the law ignores everything except the officer’s fearful instant, it undermines public confidence. The Supreme Court’s expected ruling will address that concern by reopening the courtroom door to a fuller truth-finding.

For Ashtian Barnes’s family, a favorable decision will not bring him back, but it will allow his case to be heard with all the facts on the table – a form of accountability they have sought since 2016. For the nation, Barnes v. Felix will likely set a precedent that rebalances Fourth Amendment jurisprudence toward a more balanced and fact-aware approach, reinforcing that reasonableness in law enforcement is a matter of the whole encounter, not an isolated blink of an eye. As we await the Court’s final opinion, legal practitioners and police departments alike should begin preparing for this new landscape: one where context is key, and where both constitutional rights and officer safety can be better served by acknowledging that what leads up to a use of force is often as important as the moment it occurs.

For a free legal consultation, contact us at Giordano Law Offices Personal Injury & Employment Lawyers today: www.gio-law.com/contact-us

Sources:

Barnes v. Felix, No. 23-1239, Question Presented (U.S. Sup. Ct. cert. granted Oct. 4, 2024).
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (establishing the objective reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment and emphasizing totality of circumstances and perspective of a reasonable officer)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (balancing individual’s right to life against government interests; deadly force is unreasonable unless the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious harm)
Fifth Circuit opinion below, Barnes v. Felix, 91 F.4th 393 (5th Cir. 2024) (affirming summary judgment for the officer under the “moment of the threat” doctrine; Higginbotham, J., concurring).
Cornell LII Supreme Court Bulletin: Barnes v. Felix (previewing the case, describing facts and the circuit split on “moment of threat” vs “totality of the circumstances”)Oral Argument Transcript, Barnes v. Felix (U.S. Supreme Court, Jan. 22, 2025) (questions by Justices Sotomayor, Jackson, Kagan highlighting concerns with the moment-of-threat approach; questions by Justice Kavanaugh raising law enforcement concerns).
Nahmod Law Blog, “An Important Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Deadly Force Case: Barnes v. Felix in the Supreme Court” (Jan. 23, 2025) by Prof. Sheldon Nahmod (analysis of the case, noting the circuit split and predicting the Court will adopt totality-of-circumstances, making prior officer conduct a factor).
Amicus Brief of Cato Institute et al. in Barnes v. Felix (arguing that the moment-of-threat rule is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and results in unjust outcomes).
Amicus Brief of the States of Texas et al. in Barnes v. Felix (supporting respondent, arguing that abandoning the moment-of-threat standard could chill police work and impact resources).
Amicus Brief of Color of Change et al. in Barnes v. Felix (highlighting the disproportionate impact of aggressive traffic enforcement on minority communities and how the moment-of-threat doctrine exacerbates that).
Police1 News, “Moment of threat vs. totality: Supreme Court to decide standard for police use of force” (Sept. 8, 2024) (summarizing the Barnes case and circuit split from a law enforcement perspective).
Logan Hocking Times, “Supreme Court appears ready to revive use-of-force case over deadly Harris County deputy shooting” (Jan. 24, 2025) (reporting that the Justices seemed to favor allowing Barnes’s case to proceed, likely rejecting the moment-of-threat doctrine).
[Additional case law citations within text: Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60 F.3d 695 (10th Cir. 1995); Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999); County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).]